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China’s Strategic Interests and its impacts on Bangladesh 
 
Since its foundation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has made substantial moves 
into South Asia. Besides Pakistan, it seems that over the last years Bangladesh in 
particular came into the focus of Chinese strategic thinkers. There is no doubt that Beijing 
made far-reaching inroads into Bangladesh by taking advantage of the need for urgent 
development in all spheres of economic life. With its extraordinarily large cash reserves 
China created by its extensive trade surplus is best equipped to help out. Subsequently, 
Beijing’s approach towards the subcontinent in general and Bangladesh in particular is 
mostly economic and diplomatic -including a strong military component- in nature. But 
China’s attitude to most of the South Asian states is opportunistic, and rather aggressive 
with coercive elements than determined by friendship. The annexation of Tibet, the Indo-
China war of 1962 and other armed skirmishes with Chinese involvement in 1967 (Chola 
incident) and 1987 (Sumdorong Chu Valley), the questionable takeover of Aksai Chin 
(Kashmir region) can be seen as a proof for that too. Also, China’s current “over-
assertiveness” towards Japan and South East Asian states as well as its behaviour in the 
South China Sea should be interpreted as an alarming trend. 
 
However, Chinese interests in Bangladesh were only made possible through the departure 
of British colonial rule and the subsequent transfer of power (1947) to the newly 
independent states of India and Pakistan, the latter of which was divided into an Western 
and Eastern Wing (today known as the independent state of Bangladesh). It is often 
argued that the fact that China has no real contentious issues with Bangladesh helped to 
bolster bilateral relations. However, such statements ignore the dubious and negative role 
China played in the liberation struggle of the Bangladeshi people. China strongly supported 
Pakistan and its policy of internal colonization and exploitation of East Pakistan . 
Furthermore, Beijing initially refused to recognize Bangladesh as an independent state and 
opposed Bangladesh’s entry into the United Nations. A major reason was to appease 
Pakistan (which was facilitating a rapprochement between the US and China at that time) 
by supporting its efforts to undermine each step towards secession or substantial 
autonomy of its eastern wing. Having this in mind, one can state that quite from the 
beginning Bangladesh was an element of a larger strategy of China in South Asia in order 
to realize its national interests. However, the concerns and well-being of the Bangladesh 
people that were submitted to the yoke of West Pakistan’s military rule were not 
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necessarily part of Beijing’s strategic visions. It is crucial to realize that besides some slight 
changes in priorities, the motivation behind China’s activities in the area remain the very 
same since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It is significant to 
point out, that the proclaimed ‘shift’ in China’s policy towards Bangladesh in the following 
decades, meaning from hostility to friendship, must be seen as a misnomer. It is argued 
here that Beijing did not change its attitude regarding Bangladesh at all. Hence, 
Bangladesh is merely seen as a platform for the realization of Beijing’s strategic goals in 
the Indian-Ocean and Pacific region. But what are the Chinese interests in Bangladesh? 
 
First, building-up a strategic foothold in South Asia to undermine each non-regional 
influence, especially the Soviets/Russia and the United states. In this context, it seems 
obvious that China wants to establish Bangladesh (besides Pakistan) as another 
bridgehead for Chinese interests in South Asia. 
Second, countering all hegemonic ambitions of India in the South Asian region. Therefore, 
to avert India’s development into a major Asian power which would be in a position to 
challenge China’s claim to be Asia’s leading might. Consequently, the containment and 
encirclement of India is essential for Beijing’s strategy towards the region. The fact that 
China maintains a keen interest in doing business with India is not seen as a contradiction 
to the above mentioned goals among Chinese political leadership, but rather as a logical 
outcome. If China manages to bring Bangladesh within its sphere of influence, it would 
definitely jeopardize India’s as well as the US’s ‘grand South Asian strategy’ of containing 
Beijing’s geostrategic ambitions.  
Third, another significant element on China’s agenda, which gained increasing importance 
parallel to the country’s growing economy and its desperate need for energy and raw 
materials, is the unhindered access to and exploitation of Bangladesh’s natural resources. 
Fourth, for the same reason, the Chinese developed a keen interest in establishing and 
controlling overland trade routes (e.g. Pakistan’s Karakoram highway) as well as by sea 
(especially the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz). One of the latest examples is the project to 
establish the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor (BCIM). Another 
Chinese idea is the re-establishment of a “maritime Silk Road", which should not only help 
to connect South and South East Asia but also to entrench the cooperation with peninsular 
South East Asia. 
Fifth, China also sees an opportunity to have an additional option to extend its relations 
with the Muslim world, which is already promoted via Pakistan. This was made possible 
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especially due to the increasing trend of Islamisation and attempts to undermine the 
secular foundation of the state by the past military rulers (Major General Ziaur Rahman 
1975-81 and under Lieutenant General Hussain M. Ershad 1982-90) in Bangladesh. 
Sixth, rebalancing China’s relations with South East Asian states is also an element of 
Beijing’s strategic objectives. After a series of disputes about territory and resources in 
South East Asia and an increasing tensed relationship with Japan, it seems that Chinese 
foreign policy thinkers are trying to regain more leverage in the South Eastern sphere of 
Asia. Apparently China’s objection in this direction is to win over as many of the littoral 
states in South and South East Asia as possible under its umbrella. This is done not only to 
undermine China’s claims in the Indian and Pacific Ocean but also to support its goal to 
tighten control over maritime routes. Due to its geographical location, Bangladesh could 
gain an important role in the Chinese attempt to establish and consolidate partnerships, 
especially in mainland South East Asia. Therefore, one can state that Dhaka has a less-
known but eminent role in Beijing’s regional rebalancing efforts. 
Seventh, in order to maintain its huge trade surplus China depends heavily on trade of its 
export goods and resources. Therefore, it is essential for Beijing to enter and ensure 
Bangladesh as market for its products.  
 
Taking all these interests into account, the territory of Bangladesh fits perfectly into the 
puzzle of Chinese interests of its South Asian policy. However, many observers believe that 
Dhaka is just seen as one piece in the so called "string of pearls" helping to manifest 
China's bid for regional primacy in the Southern Asian region. In sum, Beijing’s agenda 
towards independent Bangladesh (as well as former East Pakistan), as in all other areas in 
which China is active, is strictly guided by its strategic interests. This is of course not an 
unknown phenomenon and illegitimate behavior of states in international politics. However, 
Dhaka should be aware of the fact that Beijing’s priorities in South Asia are not necessarily 
in line with the national interests and an optimal socio-economic and political development 
of Bangladesh. There are severe indications, that China’s endeavors to implement its goals 
are often accompanied with negative impacts of the domestic developments in affected 
areas. It is important to understand that Bangladesh will not constitute an exception 
regarding this phenomenon. Several observations are in support of this assessment. 
 
First, Chinese development projects primarily serve the exploitation of a country or to build 
up a market for cheap Chinese products. In many cases this has led to a destruction of the 
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local economy and the expulsion of the traditional local industry. In this context, it is 
necessary to elaborate more on China’s economic and development strategies and their 
impact on Bangladesh’s economy. Basically, Bangladesh possess theoretically an 
extraordinary potential to grow, the county is blocked or paralyzed by a deconstructive 
polarization between the leading (civilian) political forces, endemic corruption, lack of 
infrastructure among many other things. However, a major challenge is the country’s 
undiversified economy. Two examples should be pointed out here. First, agriculture 
remains one of the most significant sectors which persistently haves to face natural 
disasters. Second, the garment industry, which is the most crucial sector for exports and to 
counterbalance the tremendous trade imbalance of Bangladesh, is in a bad condition. Most 
noteworthy is that the garment industries suffers from slowing exports to Europe (end of 
the decade-old Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) which granted Bangladesh and other 
developing states certain guaranteed export quotas) and to the US. The end of the MFA 
has cut down privileges for Dhaka because of worrying conditions of the rights and safety 
of workers, especially because of the alarming situation in the country’s garment industries, 
among other reasons. The loss of trade advantages is gaining more significance because 
China is emerging as a major competitor for Bangladesh’s garment industries, despite the 
much cheaper Bangladeshi labor. 
 
Second, long-term sustainable success of Chinese development projects are hampered by 
a lack of local ownership. Infrastructure projects, like the port in Chittagong (the economic 
hub of Bangladesh) or the China-Bangladesh highway, carried out by Beijing support the 
Chinese interests in logistical terms rather than the build-up of a coherent infrastructure in 
the respective countries. In order to achieve this and to avoid any potential regional 
resistance, China prefers to work with central authorities to implement projects through a 
top-down approach. As a result, there is regularly a noteworthy lack of local ownership, 
meaning that the population living in the areas of development projects is mostly not 
included in the decision and implementation process of such projects as in Pakistan’s 
Baluchistan or Gilgit-Baltistan. Subsequently, in many cases projects are lacking 
significantly sustainability. Furthermore, due to the elite-centric approach, Chinese 
development projects will not take Bangladesh state and society out of social-economic 
stagnation and poverty or its political deadlock. Rather, it will lead to a further 
entrenchment of the culture of patron-clientelism and will worsen corruption.    
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Third, efficient exploitation of resources regularly results in significant environmental 
damage or loss of cultural heritage. A serious example thereof is the likelihood of the 
destruction of Mes Aynak in Afghanistan, an ancient Buddhist city which is the most 
important archaeological discovery but threatened by Chinese resource exploitation. Until 
now, there is no comprehensive and coherent concept in sight to avoid large scale 
environmental damage or loss of cultural heritage in the wake of China’s development of 
infrastructure and resource exploitation.  
 
Fourth, Chinese activities are leading to a narrowed focus on security paradigm to the 
disadvantage of constructive and sustainable regional cooperation. In this context one 
must state, that China’s activities in South Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular do 
not help to stabilize the region especially nor to promote a rapprochement between 
conflicting parties in the numerous conflicts in South Asia over water, resources, territory 
etc. Instead of strengthening mediation and negotiation, Chinese activities in South Asia 
seems to encourage certain states to follow a policy of strength and deterrence. Dhaka 
should be aware that its relations with Beijing add much to the already high level of 
mistrust in India-China relations as well as enhancing insecurity, trepidation and skepticism 
among the smaller South Asian states. The massive increase of China’s military presence 
in South Asia, the growing number of naval & maritime facilities in the Indian Ocean region, 
and Chinese support for the armament of South Asian armies - like the ones of Bangladesh 
and Pakistan - added tremendously to the militarization of South Asia. For example, New 
Delhi is extremely worried about the safety of its Siliguri corridor, also known as the 
‘chicken neck’, which is a thin strip of land connecting mainland India with its north-eastern 
states. It is apparent that the deepening and extending military partnership between Beijing 
and Dhaka is perceived as a crucial threat to the stability of India’s north-eastern flank. This 
would function as an additional burden in the Dhaka-New Delhi ties and further complicate 
unsolved issues between both countries. As such, it keeps the attention of the political 
decision makers on security driven by geopolitical and strategic interests to the 
disadvantage of sustainable development. Instead of investing as much as possible in non-
security related development, China’s role in South Asia is drawing the region into an arms 
race, which is going far beyond the financial limitations of the respective individual states. 
In consequence, the classical security dilemma remains the central feature of South Asia’s 
security architecture. 
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Fifth, there is an indirect contribution to growing Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. It 
was obviously well-perceived by China that Bangladesh was opening up to the Muslim 
world. In order to do so, Bangladesh military rule introduced an increasing policy of 
Islamisation. This policy turned out over the years to be one of the most dangerous threats 
towards the Bangladeshi state and society. The fact that Bangladesh was perceived as one 
of the world’s new hubs of international terrorism and militant Islamism under the last BNP 
government can be seen as a strong indication thereof. The massive militant disturbance of 
the whole 2014 general election process by supporters of the BNP and Islamist Jamaat 
party is one of the most recent outcomes of an unfortunate political trajectory catalyzed by 
China’s support of military rulers and the last BNP-Jamaat government. Therefore the 
halfhearted appeal of the Chinese authorities to stop the violence between the different 
political forces was rather symbolic in nature than a determined intervention. In sum, it 
seems that the growing influence of the Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh is not 
worrying the respective political quarters in Beijing in order to reassess their foreign policy 
priorities regarding South Asia. The fact that China was able to maintain a traditional, 
‘relatively normalized relationship’ with the Afghan Taliban corroborates the above 
mentioned statement.   
 
Sixth, there are negative impacts on the processes of democratic transition and 
consolidation. China’s role in Bangladesh marks also a severe intrusion into the country’s 
political-administrative structure challenging indirectly the quality of democracy. For 
example, Chinese activities in Bangladesh have severe implications for the latter’s civil-
military relations. In the first years after independence under the presidency of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, there were no doubts that civil-military relations in Bangladesh were 
tensed. This was mainly due to the president’s robust strategies to gain leverage over the 
country’s armed forces (e.g. build-up of countervailing forces under civilian command and 
strict control over the military budget) as well as the extraordinary negative experience 
during the rule of West Pakistan’s military. However, under Mujibur Rahman there were 
strong indications that civilians were trying to reclaim decision-making power in all policy 
fields, which had traditionally been dominated by the West Pakistan soldiers and a 
compliant bureaucracy. However, since the military started to take over power directly, the 
Chinese started to establish diplomatic relations and supported the military. It is interesting 
to recall here that China did not recognize the newly independent state before. What is 
more, it undermined the independence movement due to its close ties with Pakistan. 
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Political-diplomatic back-up for the West Pakistani military crackdown in Bangladesh/East 
Pakistan and delivering of training and support to the West Pakistani armed forces were 
some elements of China’s ambiguous role in Bangladesh’s liberation struggle. However, as 
in the case of Pakistan, one must state that the Chinese support for military regimes 
apparently helped them to stabilise their governments, boost their image, provided 
resources via development projects, which at the end enhanced the entrenchment of a role 
of the soldiers in Bangladesh’s political arena. In consequence, this is challenging the 
notion of civilian control of the military which is a necessary ingredient for liberal 
democracy and its consolidation. 
 
Seventh, China’s support for Bangladesh’s military is leading to a growing dependence on 
Beijing. It should be worrisome for Bangladesh (especially for the civilian) security circles 
that the country relies on China as major supplier for military procurement. Of course this 
might have some logistical and technical advantages for the military administration but in 
economic and political terms such a narrow supply chain obviously creates dependencies 
and risks. The phenomenon that besides complaints over the quality of Chinese equipment 
the Bangladesh Armed Forces is keeping cooperation with China in high esteem should be 
carefully observed. The fact that major Chinese weapon systems are cheap and 
unconditionally available (at least regarding human rights situation and status of 
democratic consolidation) might be important reasons but not the core argument to rely 
solely on them. It seems clear that political reasons are important determinants for ignoring 
a broader diversification of military supply. Furthermore, like in Pakistan there is the 
imminent threat that the increasing military-to-military cooperation between Bangladesh 
and China is developing its own dynamic - not appropriately recognized by civilian 
oversight mechanism. In result, Chinese support for the Bangladesh Armed Forces inherit 
not only the peril of challenging the country’s national sovereignty but also limiting civilian 
decision-making power.  
 
Finally, China is obviously trying to limit Bangladesh’s room to manoeuvre in international 
relations. In other words, Beijing spends substantial efforts to convince Dhaka to toe the 
line of China’s foreign policy parameters quite from the beginning. Here, Bangladesh’s 
relations with South East Asian states offer two remarkable examples thereof: Dhaka’s 
attempt to establish relations with Vietnam in 1978 and the so called ‘Taiwan Office Affair’ 
in Dhaka in 2004. Regarding Vietnam, after offering an opening up for deeper relations, 
10 
Bangladesh foreign policy circles had to back-pedal by condemning Vietnam’s intervention 
in Cambodia. In the context of Taiwan, Dhaka was forced to undermine everything which 
was identified as a challenge towards Beijing’s ‘One-China-Policy’. More concretely, the 
Bangladesh authorities had to make unequivocally clear that the Taiwanese office is not 
permitted at all to offer any consular services. In both cases, one has to state that 
autonomous political decision making in Bangladesh foreign policy was undermined with 
negative impacts on the country’s relation to South East Asia. Today, Dhaka should also 
not forget the larger picture in Southeast and East Asia, especially its relations with Japan 
and South Korea. Bangladesh maintained traditionally good relations with Tokyo as well as 
with Soul and the country benefitted enormously from bilateral trade and economic 
cooperation. Furthermore, Japan is an extraordinary, significant donor for Bangladesh. 
However, the rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific regions between China and Japan and 
other regional states might force Bangladesh to take a position, most likely on Chinese 
lines. In other words, that the relation with China is not only derogating ties with India but 
also with countries which proofed to be trustworthy partners. This would be fatal if one 
takes into account, Bangladesh strong dependence on foreign aid and assistance. 
 
In sum, Dhaka has to remember that the Chinese projects are highly costly and Beijing 
knows very well that the opportunities of reaping the benefits of its development endeavors 
are always challenged, especially in a country’s affected by extremely volatile political and 
security related conditions. Therefore, it does not come by surprise that China wants to be 
confident that it is able to have the political situation and the decision-making processes in 
its client state always under control. Consequently, Bangladesh’s political leadership 
should not fall into the trap of trying to attract economic and military assistance from China 
by all means. 
